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Using a social harm approach, this paper locates the fire at Grenfell Tower as 
an event from which a variety of dimensions of social harms unfolded. These 
are most obviously physical as well as emotional and psychological harms, 
albeit some harmful effects are less immediately apparent than others. Thus, 
the paper also identifies a range of cultural, financial and economic harms, as 
well as harms of recognition associated with the fire. These harms unfold in 
ripples, initially around the burning tower, then disperse geographically and 
longitudinally. Moreover, they are layered, they interact, they synergistically 
produce new and heightened levels of harm. These harms will endure 
throughout communities within and beyond the Borough of Kensington and 
Chelsea for many years to come. 
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Introduction: The Lens of Social Harm 
 
In the first hour of 14th June, 2017 a fire broke out in Grenfell Tower, a 24-
storey tower block on the Lancaster West estate in North Kensington, west 
London. The fire killed at least 72 people. It seems very likely that the acts and 
omissions which produced the fire will ultimately lead to some form of criminal 
prosecutions, perhaps of organisations, of individuals, or both, whether under 
fire or health and safety legislation or, indeed, the Corporate Manslaughter 
and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. However, irrespective of whether or not 
the fire was a crime, we can draw upon the ‘social harm’ perspective to clearly 
identify a whole series of harms which both produced, and then were 
generated by, it. This article is concerned with the harms of the aftermath of 
the fire – although some of the harms so produced are also part of an 
explanation of how the fire emerged. 
 
1 Steve Tombs is Professor of Criminology at The Open University. He has a long-standing interest in 
the incidence, nature and regulation of corporate and state crime and harm and has published widely 
on these matters. He has long worked with the Hazards movement in the UK, and is a Trustee and 
Board member of Inquest. 
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There are good reasons why a social harm perspective is a useful lens 
through which to view “Britain’s worst fire in a century” (C4 News, 30 July 
20172). While the lens of ‘crime’ all-too-often restricts us to a ‘snapshot’ of an 
intentional act or acts, a social harm perspective allows us to incorporate 
omissions, decision and non-decisions taken, policies developed, defended 
and implemented, and practices and cultures established, over long periods of 
time – so that we can then think of these in combination in terms of conditions, 
states of affairs, incubating phenomena and triggering events, and chains of 
processes. This complexity characterises the necessary antecedents to high 
consequence phenomena such as Grenfell, but also many others known to 
readers of this journal, such as Bhopal, Hillsborough, Piper Alpha and so on.  
These are relatively familiar arguments ‘for’ a social harm approach. But a 
novel contribution of this article, and the organising logic of what follows, is to 
indicate the ability of a social harm lens to capture the range of harmful 
consequences that follow from any specific event; to capture the various 
dimensions of social harms; to explore how these unfold; to note that these 
unfold in ripples, initially and perhaps most intensely within a specific time and 
place – here, a burning tower – but then disperse geographically and 
longitudinally. Further, these harms do not exist nor unfold in a discrete sense 
– they are layered, they interact - often complexly – thus producing new or 
heightened levels of harm through their synergistic effects. In a sense, this 
article is also an attempt to begin to think about ‘how harm works’. 
 
The Grenfell Tower Fire in Context 
 
Grenfell Tower is located in Notting Dale Ward of the Royal Borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea, one of the poorest wards in the Borough (Royal 
Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Council, 2014), and is located in the 
English Index of Multiple Deprivation Lower Super Output Area3 (LSOA) 
denominator E01002880. In 2015, this was ranked the 3,171th most deprived 
LSOA of the 32,844 LSOAs in England – that is, in the 10 percent “of the most 
multiply deprived LSOAs in England” (Murray, 2017). 
Murray sets out each of the domain areas which constitute the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation, ranking the LSOA in which Grenfell Tower sits by decile 
– where 1 indicates the most deprived ten per cent of LSOAs in England 
(Murray, 2017).  
 
 
2 All C4 News reports cited in this paper were last accessed at 31 December 2017 at 
https://www.channel4.com/news/?s=grenfell 
3 The smallest unit of analysis, drilling down to an area of some 500-600 households or 1500 people. 
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Table 1: The Grenfell Tower LSOA 
 
Domains of Deprivation  LSOA ranking by 
decile 
Income  1 
Employment,  2 
Education, skills and training  5 
Health and disability  3 
Crime  4 
Barriers to housing and services  1 
Living environment  2 
Multiple Deprivation  1 
 
Source: adapted from Murray, 2017.   
 
On the basis of the Government’s own data, then, this is an area of absolute 
deprivation – but it also sits cheek-by-jowl with one of the richest areas in the 
country, making the extent of relative deprivation staggering. The Borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea “is among London’s most unequal, with extreme 
poverty and wealth living side by side. Data shows that the vicinity of the tower 
was among the top 10% most deprived areas in England in 2015 …The 
constituency of Kensington, which makes up most of the local authority of 
Kensington and Chelsea, is the wealthiest in England” where “The average 
terraced house sold for £4.3m in 2016” (Barr, 2017). Thus Murray contrasts 
LSOA E01002880 with what he calls the ‘Kings Road South’ LSOA in the 
Borough where “the rankings for income, employment, education and health 
are all in the most advantaged decile and in the 96 to 97 per cent range of the 
least deprived. For income, employment and education the rankings are in the 
top one per cent of the most advantaged” (Murray, 2017). 
Thus, while the borough has “the highest average incomes in London”, its 
north end is characterised by “above average poverty rates, child poverty, and 
receipt of out-of-work benefits” (London’s Poverty Profile, 2017). There are 
other correlates of such inequalities of course, one being life-expectancy. As 
the recent Marmot review noted, life expectancy varies across English local 
authorities - an average of 74 for men in Blackpool and 79 for women in 
Manchester as compared to 83 and 86 for men and women respectively in 
Kensington and Chelsea. But this masks considerable inequalities within 
Kensington and Chelsea. Thus the starkest inequalities within English Local 
Authorities were to be found “in Blackpool, Stockton on Tees and Kensington 
and Chelsea” where the inequalities translate into life expectancy differentials 
between the poorest and richest “in the region of 14 to 15 years” (Institute of 
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Health Equity, 2017: 3). Indeed, it is not just that the area within which Grenfell 
Tower sits is absolutely and relatively poor – but, as Emma Dent Coad’s recent 
report indicates, it is getting poorer. According to this collation of data by the 
local MP, since 2010 the poor in the constituency have got poorer, the rich 
richer, and inequality in the most unequal area in England has widened – for 
example, in one ward, average life expectancy had declined by six years from 
2010-2017 (Coad, 2017: 1). 
It is in this context that we can better understand the conditions in which 
residents of Grenfell Tower (and the wider Lancaster West Estate) and, most 
crucially, the relationships of these residents with Royal Borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) Council and the Kensington and Chelsea 
Tenants Management Organisation (KCTMO), to which the Council had 
transferred the management of the Borough’s entire council housing stock, 
9,700 homes, in 1996 (Boughton, 2017).  
Stanning (2017) has argued that KCTMO was universally hated by those it 
housed across the Borough, a hatred which “goes beyond the usual suspicion 
of residents towards those who have power over them. KCTMO has for years 
been an unaccountable and deeply resented part of life for many Kensington 
and Chelsea residents”. I discuss what I think is best characterised as an 
attitude of contempt by the KCTMO for Grenfell residents further below, but 
for now it should be noted that the nature of this contemptuous relationship 
was perhaps nowhere better captured than in the refurbishment of the Tower 
which was ultimately to prove fatal for at least 72 of its residents – and the 
disastrous decision to clad the Tower for aesthetic reasons, “because it was an 
eyesore for the rich people who live opposite” (Akala, musician and local 
resident, C4 News, 2017).  Such relationships typify wider processes of 
gentrification and social cleansing in many of the UK’s inner cities, but most 
notably in London.  
Formed in 2010, the Grenfell Action Group (GAG) joined with Unite 
Community Membership in 2015 principally as a result of concerns about the 
refurbishment of the tower block (Grenfell Action Group, 2015b). In this 
context, the Group documented “threatening and intimidatory tactics” being 
used by the TMO and Rydon, the lead contractor in the Tower’s refurbishment, 
to get access to flats – access which had been denied in response to what GAG 
saw as sub-standard and dangerous work. In this context, the Group set out a 
long list of residents’ “primary concerns with regards TMO/Rydon”, at the top 
of which was the “(l)ack of meaningful consultation with residents and feeling 
of total disregard for tenant and leaseholders’ well-being” (Grenfell Action 
Group, 2015a). Safety concerns relating to the lack of fire safety instructions, 
power surges, the single staircase egress in the event of a fire and the exposure 
of gas pipes within the flats as a result of the refurbishment were commonly 
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expressed. As GAG posted at 5am on the morning of the fire as the Tower was 
still in flames,   
Regular readers of this blog will know that we have posted numerous 
warnings in recent years about the very poor fire safety standards at 
Grenfell Tower and elsewhere in RBKC. ALL OUR WARNINGS FELL ON 
DEAF EARS and we predicted that a catastrophe like this was 
inevitable and just a matter of time (Grenfell Action Group, 2017).  
The starkest of these warnings had been published in November 2016, under 
the apocryphal but prescient headline KCTMO – Playing with fire!, which 
included the following, chilling passage: 
It is a truly terrifying thought but the Grenfell Action Group firmly 
believe that only a catastrophic event will expose the ineptitude and 
incompetence of our landlord, the  KCTMO, and bring an end to the 
dangerous living conditions and neglect of health and safety 
legislation that they inflict upon their tenants and leaseholders. … 
[O]nly an incident that results in serious loss of life of KCTMO 
residents will allow the external scrutiny to occur that will shine a light 
on the practices that characterise the malign governance of this non-
functioning organisation…  
 
The Grenfell Action Group predict that it won’t be long before the 
words of this blog come back to haunt the KCTMO management and 
we will do everything in our power to ensure that those in authority 
know how long and how appallingly our landlord has ignored their 
responsibility to ensure the health and safety of their tenants and 
leaseholders. They can’t say that they haven’t been warned! 
(Grenfell Action Group, 2016, bold emphasis in original) 
 
Grenfell: Dimensions of Social Harm  
Before turning to discuss some of the key harms produced by the fire, an 
overview of the key elements of the concept of social harm is necessary (for a 
fuller treatment, see Boukli and Kotzé, 2018 and Hillyard and Tombs, 2017). In 
seeking to mark out the terrain constituted by ‘social harm’, Hillyard and 
Tombs (2004) had originally suggested a fourfold typology, some elements of 
which, if not wholly unproblematic, are in essence at least more self-evident 
than others. This typology incorporated: physical harms; financial/economic 
harms, the former located at the level of individuals and households, the latter 
66    GRENFELL 
 
JUSTICE, POWER AND RESISTANCE 
at the local, regional or national levels; emotional and psychological harm; and 
harms arising out of a denial of what Alvesalo had termed ‘cultural safety’ 
(Alvesalo, 1999: 4), encompassing notions of autonomy, development and 
growth, and access to cultural, intellectual and information resources 
generally available in any given society. Subsequently, while there was very 
little discussion about these categories per se, much of the critical reaction to 
Hillyard, Tombs and others’ work involved a critique of questioning the 
ontological basis of social harm (see, for example, Garside, 2013 and Lasslett, 
2010). In one such consideration, Majid Yar claimed misrecognition as the 
ontological basis for social harm (Yar, 2012). While I have argued that I find 
this claim in itself unconvincing (Tombs, 2018a), it does seem to me wholly 
persuasive to see mis-recognition as a key dimension of social harm, one 
capturing a relational lack of respect for human dignity, integrity and well-
being – which, as I note below, in its extreme form might be captured by the 
term ‘contempt’.  
In what remains the most developed single treatment of social harm, 
Pemberton (2015) sets out an over-lapping but distinct typology of harms, 
which incorporates: physical and mental health harms; autonomy harms, 
which result from situations where we experience ‘fundamental disablement’ 
in relation to our attempts to achieve self-actualisation; and relational harms, 
the latter coming in two forms - harms resulting from enforced exclusion from 
social relationships (enforced exclusion from personal relationships and social 
networks) and harms of misrecognition, which result from the symbolic 
injuries which serve to misrepresent the identities of individuals belonging to 
specific social groups (Pemberton, 2015: 13-34). 
In what follows, I draw upon the above work to document harms in the 
following categories:  physical; psychological and emotional (capturing 
Pemberton’s ‘mental health harms’), cultural (capturing some aspects of 
Alvesalo’s ‘cultural safety’ and Pemberton’s harms); harms of recognition, 
which raises to the fore one aspect of Pemberton’s ‘relational harm’ simply 
because it is clear that its presence and significance is so striking in this case; 
and financial and economic harms, set out in Hillyard and Tombs’ original 
(2004) formulation. This is not to claim this is a definitive typology, nor to deny 
that some of its elements require further development – the idea of cultural 
harms, for example, has recently been subject to extensive, potentially very 
significant consideration (Copson, 2018), while notably the discussion here 
omits consideration of Pemberton’s ‘autonomy harms’. The latter in general 
are highly significant but in this particular context would be much more 
pertinent to an analysis of how the fire was produced – the systematic 
dismissal of the wants, needs and concerns of the Tower’s residents by the 
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Council and the KCTMO; but it is clearly closely related to their post hoc 
treatment as captured by use of the category ‘harms of recognition’.  
Finally, such considerations lead me to the observation that there is a 
sense in which the experiences of harm generated through the data I worked 
with in turn produced the particular categories which have been used in this 
article – a process emphasised as a positive feature of this perspective by 
Hillyard and Tombs (2004: 20), so that the “social harm approach is partially 
to be defined in its very operationalisation, in its efforts to measure social 
harms”. All of this implies that as studies within the social harm perspective 
proliferate that they pay greater attention to thinking about the categories, 
types and dimensions which are being described, mapped, analysed, 
conceptualised and theorised, rather than simply referring to ‘social harm’ as 
an un-differentiated category.  
Three prior points. First, the categories deployed below are analytical – 
thus, in the real world, there is overlap, and indeed what are presented as 
apparently discrete harms in fact impact in combination and do so 
differentially upon specific groups of people, thus multiplying the harms they 
produce; the harms and their impacts are layered and synergistic. Second, I 
hope to indicate how such effects simultaneously ripple out to impact not 
simply the bereaved and local residents, but also throughout and beyond the 
local community, and indeed through marginalised communities across the 
country – notably those living in socially provided tower blocks, but also those 
communities who are most dependent upon services and facilities provided 
by local authorities. These ripple effects also occur through time, in some ways 
which are as yet unknowable. 
Third, a brief note on method. None of what follows is based upon primary 
research – I have not, for example, had direct contact with any of the bereaved 
or survivors, even though I attempt here to articulate the various harms which 
they have been and are experiencing. Nor do I intend to do so. While I have 
worked with many bereaved families over many years, these are families with 
whom, in a Gramscian sense, I have had some form of organic relationship – 
unlike those in and around Grenfell. That said, Grenfell is a multi-fatality 
disaster in the age of 24-hour media; there is a mass of material about Grenfell 
in the public domain, and some of this consists of relatively unmediated, direct 
access to the voices of local people themselves, whether this be via the 
broadcast media (accessible long after recording), the print media, or through 
blogs and various social media accounts. To the extent to which here I support 
my claims with the voices of the residents, then these latter are the sources I 
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have used to do so.4 These points being made, in the context of the arguments 
of this article, I soon reached saturation point – such voices were often 
articulating variations on a theme as regards, for example, the horrors of 14th 
June 2017, or the experiences of temporary accommodation. For these 
reasons therefore, and of course for reasons of space, I use these voices here 
relatively sparingly. 
 
Physical Harms  
 
The most manifest harms associated with the fire are, of course, the official 
count of the 72 deaths which it caused, making it one of the most serious 
multiple fatality fires in peacetime British history. Beyond these fatalities, the 
number of people hospitalised was far fewer than might have been the case: 
notably, there were relatively few injuries from burns because the intensity of 
the fire meant that those who came into direct contact with it died. Most of 
those who were hospitalised following the fire were suffering the effects of 
smoke inhalation. A week after the fire, the clinical director of the major 
trauma centre at King's College Hospital, said that : "Many of the people who 
have survived will go on to make a good recovery, but how many will have life-
changing injuries remains to be seen. It may take weeks and months for some 
patients to recover physically” (The Scotsman, 2017). 
There are other possible physical health effects of the fire which are less 
predictable, even identifiable. It is not fully known what airborne toxins might 
have been emitted as a result of the fire, and what long-term effects exposures 
to these might be to residents and those living in the vicinity. Asbestos was 
present in the building and would have broken down at the heat levels 
experienced in the fire. Public Health England stated on 30th June, more than 
two weeks after the fire, that 
It is possible that very small amounts of asbestos fibres will have been 
dispersed within the smoke plume but would have formed only a 
small fraction of the smoke and particles released in the fire; all smoke 
is toxic and any asbestos would present a minimal additional risk to 
health. 
Asbestos related diseases are typically associated with a long term 
workplace exposure to high levels of airborne asbestos fibres. 
 
4 Future researchers will of course be able to access in verbatim the evidence given to the Grenfell 
Tower Inquiry by survivors and the bereaved, who began to do so as this article was completed, on 3rd 
October 2018. 
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Safety officers working with teams currently on the site have tested 
the air within Grenfell Tower for dust and asbestos and have not 
detected any levels of concern. (Public Health England, nd)  
However, at this date, the monitoring point was located some three-
quarters of a mile away from the Tower (C4 News, 29 June, 2017). Moreover, 
notwithstanding the above claim that asbestos-related diseases are the result 
of prolonged workplace exposure, it is in fact the case that there is no safe 
level of exposure: asbestos-related cancers can be caused by exposure to one 
fibre, and exposures regularly occur in all types of buildings rather than simply, 
or in fact even, in workplaces.  Indeed, 15 months after the fire, the senior 
coroner examining the deaths it had caused said that “Hundreds of survivors 
… could be at risk of asbestos poisoning and must be monitored by the NHS” 
(Booth, 2018b). 
Further, hydrogen cyanide was emitted from the burning insulation board 
and was known to be a contributory cause of death for some of the residents, 
while also resulting in others who survived being treated for cyanide 
poisoning. This is associated with long-term health effects, notably respiratory 
problems. 
In addition to causing death, injury and illness, various aspects of the 
aftermath of the fire are likely to have caused detrimental health effects. 
These are probably too numerous to consider in any detail, but two 
observations suffice to note the complex health-related harms that might have 
been generated by the fire. First, it is likely that anyone with existing problems 
of dependency at the time of the fire – notably to alcohol and/or various kinds 
of drugs, legal and otherwise - would have experienced heightened 
dependency as a result of the trauma of the fire (Agerholm, 2018). Second, 
many illnesses which are positively correlated with deprivation and thus over-
represented amongst the Tower’s residents – such as diabetes, childhood 
obesity, high levels of cholesterol and chronic heart disease - can be managed 
by controlling diet; yet this is made more difficult if not impossible for those 
living in temporary hotel or other temporary accommodation where there are 




Psychological and Emotional Harms 
 
Surviving the fire in Grenfell Tower is most obviously likely to have produced 
a whole gamut of searing psychological and emotional problems with which 
victims will live – in many cases, for the rest of their lives. Moreover, this was 
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already a population which faced mental health challenges – relatively large 
numbers in and around the Tower had come to the area “as refugees fleeing 
persecution in their countries of origin”, so that some “of the characteristics 
of the local population, such as the large numbers of people with previous 
experience of trauma, will have increased the impact of the disaster” (Strelitz 
et al., 2018: 33, 40). 
Almost paradigmatically, one survivor stated, weeks after the fire, “I still 
hear in my head the people screaming and the begging for help and we 
couldn’t do nothing … Seeing the people waving and begging for help from the 
windows, but we couldn’t do anything” (Fatima Alves, cited on C4 News, 28 
July, 2017). Trauma is likely to be associated with: grief at the loss of loved 
ones, of pets, of photos and possessions which cannot be replaced; the recall 
of the horrors of exiting the building (and of seeing others unable to do so); 
guilt at survival; as well as horrors and guilt for bystanders and members of 
the emergency services. These were all variously expressed in the aftermath 
of the fire (for example see: Kenny, 2018, Sherwood, 2017d). None are 
surprising. None are easily imaginable. None are easily remediable.  
Within a few months of the fire it was estimated by Grenfell NHS that “at 
least 11,000” people would need long term mental health treatment as a 
result of the fire (C4 News, 30 October, 2017) – a figure later corroborated 
(Agerholm, 2018). At least 20 survivors and witnesses of the fire had 
attempted to take their lives within 3 months of it, according to the charity 
Silence of Suicide (SOS). Moreover, "there are going to be many more 
instances of PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder], depression, anxiety and 
self-harming as people reach different stages of trauma” (RT, 2017). “We need 
long-term mental health provision for the next three decades at least - maybe 
longer”, said Greenway, founder of SOS, adding that there was “a lot of drug 
and alcohol dependency” among surviving residents, who had been left feeling 
“isolated” (cited in ibid.). 
David Bailey, the manager of child and adolescent mental health services 
(CAMHS) in Kensington and Chelsea, said of the scale of mental health 
problems generated by the fire:  
We’re talking thousands in terms of children, and thousands in terms 
of adults. There are the families in the tower, families that lost people 
in the tower, families who witnessed what happened, there are 
people driving past on the Westway who see the tower and who 
might have to explain to their children why it looks the way it does, 
teachers who are working with children who are bereft and terrified, 
people who work in the area, people who haven’t stopped [helping] 
since day one. It’s thousands. 
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There’s a ripple effect and I’m not envisaging this being over any time 
soon. It’s a significant event that has significantly changed this 
community (cited in Sherwood, 2017b) 
The physical reminder of the fire in the form of the charred skeleton of Grenfell 
Tower is disturbing for many residents. “The tower itself is really significant. 
We all have an emotional reaction when we look at it, and it literally hangs 
over the community as a constant reminder,” he said (ibid.). Thus, invoking 
another dimension of the psychological trauma, Bolton also noted that, 
“We're being covered in the ash of our dead friends and relatives" (RT, 2017). 
At meetings between officials and the community one man is reported as 
saying: “Our babies are having to deal with that stupid building. My kids are 
seven and three, and we’re having to deal with trauma and getting no 
assistance from any of you.” Another man stated that his three-year-old 
daughter “opens her curtains every morning and looks straight out on to the 
tower where her friend died. It’s very hard for her to comprehend what’s 
happened” (cited in Sherwood, 2017a). Exactly the same sentiments were 
being expressed one year after the fire (Fox, 2018). 
Thus, the scale of the mental health problems caused by the fire is made 
apparent by the fact that it was not just survivors and the bereaved who were 
experiencing intense psychological and emotional harms. Understandably, 
effects were felt by those who had witnessed the fire from nearby and/or 
those living in the shadow of the burnt out shell of the tower – which, aside 
from the reminder of what had happened, was, for some not inconsiderable 
time, the site of human remains, a grave. As one nearby resident put it, "We 
are the silent victims of this tragedy." He said living in the shadow of the tower, 
with no support and little information, had left him and others at "breaking 
point" (cited in Pasha-Robinson, 2017). 
Finally, in terms of the ripple effects of harms, it is worth emphasising that 
the psychological effects are not confined to the immediate surroundings of 
Grenfell. For example, in the wake of the fire, 32 tower blocks in Salford, 
Greater Manchester (some two hundred miles away from West London) had 
been deemed unsafe as a result of having similar or the same type of cladding 
used on them as at Grenfell. Nine are owned by the council, which has secured 
a loan to begin replacing the cladding, while the rest are privately owned. 
Residents of one of the latter were a focus for a BBC documentary aired in 
October 2017. Residents of Cannon Hussey Court had no idea when the work 
on their tower block would begin. As one resident observed, looking out from 
Cannon Hussey Court at other tower blocks upon which work had begun: 
“they’re getting looked after, we’re not”; as another put it, “We’re just in 
limbo and it’s a very frightening limbo to be in” (BBC North West, 2017). 
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Cultural Harms  
 
Former residents and survivors have also experienced a series of cultural 
harms, that is, harms produced by having the ways of living to which they are 
accustomed or acculturated either disturbed or, literally, removed – with most 
of these harms resulting from their physical relocation after the fire. As a result 
of this relocation, people have lost the networks, mutual supports and 
common experiences, the small things which can make a life worth living – 
even more significant in a place which has been characterised as having “a 
strong sense of identity, social capital and depth of social networks” (Strelitz 
et al., 2018: 37). They no longer see people they know or recognise on the 
walk, bus or tube to work or school, at the local shops, in the park, café, or 
pub. Indeed, they have lost these aspects of their daily lives at a time when 
they probably needed them most. 
Thus, these cultural harms are often deeply inter-twined with the kinds of 
emotional and psychological harms discussed in the previous section. Of the 
latter, many of these are of course to be expected in the light of an awful event 
such as that at Grenfell and, to some extent, perhaps unavoidable – albeit they 
can be mitigated, and some are much more avoidable than others. As 
psychiatrist Lynne Jones has noted:  
In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the best things we can do 
to reduce psychological distress are usually practical. These are the 
things that matter: continuity, structure, routine, having your basic 
needs met, having access to information and justice, and being able 
to bury and mourn your dead … Having shelter is fundamental, as is 
keeping people connected to those they love and their community. 
(Cited in Topping, 2017) 
The “longer families are left in limbo, the more likely it is that longer-term 
psychological problems will develop” (Topping, 2017). This sense of “limbo” – 
the suspension of accustomed ways of living - is captured in one report, three 
months after the fire: 
Grenfell resident Sid-Ali Atmani expressed incredulity at the delay. 
“For three months, people here have been discussing the same 
subject, every day, every night – housing. It’s making people more and 
more ill,” he says. The wait has been particularly distressing for his 
daughter, Hyam, 10, one of about 200 children still in hotels. “She 
comes back from school to the hotel. She doesn’t have her own 
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kitchen, her own glass. This has been going on for 90 days and 90 
nights. She is tired and frustrated.” She found it tough being cooped 
up in a cramped hotel room throughout the summer holidays. “Some 
days she sat in the lobby all day. There are a thousand different faces 
going past. She hasn’t got her toys. This is no normal life. (Gentleman, 
2017a) 
Gentleman also reports on a Lebanese woman and ex-resident of the 
tower who stated, again 3 months after the fire,  
 
I’ve no complaint about the hotel; when I leave I’ll write a nice letter 
to thank them. If I had peace of mind I would stay happily, but we 
don’t know what’s happening.” She spends most days sitting in the 
hotel reception, waiting. “Doing nothing. Looking at an iPad, watching 
cooking programmes, just to keep my mind going.” She minds not 
being able to open the window in her room or cook her own food, and 
not having any privacy. But most of all she is troubled by the 
prolonged uncertainty. (Gentleman, 2017a) 
 
Indeed, such descriptions invoke less a state of limbo, more the barest of 
existence. In terms of cultural harms, then, it is clear that in their physical 
relocation – and, hence, dispersal - many of both the routines and the 
networks which constitute social life – at school (Kensington Aldridge 
Academy was forced to close and students dispersed to nearby schools), the 
local shops, around the flats and so on – have been rent asunder.   
 
Harms of Mis-Recognition  
 
As noted above, some version of ‘mis-recognition’ is commonly highlighted as 
a key dimension of social harm. In the context of Grenfell, it is in the harms of 
mis-recognition – not simply of a lack of respect for human dignity, integrity 
and well-being but in fact a systematic contempt - that we see perhaps the 
most searing effects generated by the fire and subsequent events. On this 
point, and prior to discussing the dimensions and manifestations of contempt 
produced after the fire, it needs to be emphasised that it was these relations 
of contempt between the KCTMO and RKCBC on the one hand and the 
residents on the other which were so pivotal in producing the conditions in 
which the fire became almost an inevitability – foreseen precisely and most 
tragically of all by the residents themselves (Grenfell Action Group, 2016). 
Further, these relations can only be understood in the context of the 
enormous and growing inequalities within the Borough – highlighted above – 
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and the perverse nature of restructured housing markets produced by years 
of privatisation, deregulation and rampant neo-liberalism. These contexts 
together explain the politico-economic production of the harms manifest at 
Grenfell, “part of a larger story about unevenly precarious lives in today’s 
unequal cities ... a chilling illustration of how inequality kills” (Madden, 2017). 
It must, then, be utterly devastating for anyone remotely connected to 
Grenfell Tower to realise that this mass killing - with all the associated harm 
only outlined here – was the result of a conscious decision by the richest 
council in England to save £293,000. This level of contempt which Grenfell 
residents had “endured … for years” (C4 News, 19 July, 2017) - “a real disdain 
for people lower down the social order” (Dent Coad, cited on C4 News, 25 July, 
2017) - must generate an enduring sense of worthlessness that the residents in 
and around the area will find hard to shake off. These harms of mis-recognition 
persisted after the fire, in several different forms.   
One of the manifestations of contempt was to be found in the complete 
lack of effective immediate response or leadership in the aftermath of the 
disaster – what Theresa May was to refer to, one week after the fire, as the 
"failure of the state, local and national, to help people when they needed it 
most" (cited in Davies, 2017). In this context, one Professor in Disaster 
Management noted that “Absence of clear strategies breeds lack of trust in 
authority, loss of confidence and a fear of the future that, sadly, is often well 
founded” (David Alexander, cited in Graham-Harrison, 2017). These failures on 
the part of authority persisted and continue – as documented, for example, in 
the Initial and then the Second Report of the Independent Grenfell Recovery 
Taskforce (2017, 2018), which have documented the continuing failings of 
RKCBC and the ‘severe trust deficit’ between it and the local community 
(Independent Grenfell Recovery Taskforce, 2018).  
The continuing contempt on the part of central and local Government has 
also been repeatedly evidenced in the series of lies, half-truths and broken 
promises made to the affected households in the aftermath of the fire. One 
area of mis-trust was the palpable failure to meet the commitment made by 
the Prime Minister in the immediate aftermath of the fire – namely that “every 
person made homeless would receive an offer of accommodation within three 
weeks”. In fact, this was subsequently “clarified” as meaning temporary 
accommodation (BBC, 2017a). In November 2017, RBKC Council “promised 
that every survivor would have the opportunity to move into a new home 
before Christmas” (Gentleman, 2017b), while weeks later the Minister for 
Housing and Planning estimated it would take RBKC Council “up to 12 months” 
to rehome families. Moreover, the promise of being offered like-for-like 
tenancies was repeatedly broken (ibid.).  As the Chair of Grenfell United noted, 
“For the survivors and affected families it seems like one broken promise after 
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another” (ibid.). Exactly one year after the fire, only 82 of the 203 households 
that needed rehousing were in new, permanent accommodation (Booth and 
Bowcott, 2018); 72 were still not even in temporary but in emergency (hotel 
or B&B) accommodation (Booth et al., 2018). Moreover, none of these 
statements make reference to another 128 households who were forced to 
leave their homes on the wider Lancaster West Estate – a group never referred 
to in Government statements about rehousing (Wearmouth, 2018). 
A further area of mis-trust was the shifting and uncertain nature of the 
‘amnesty’ offered to undocumented residents (Pasha-Robinson, 2018) – 
originally stated at one year, then extended for 3 further months, followed by 
a policy announcement that “survivors would be able to apply for further 
periods of limited leave to remain, building up to five years. They could then 
apply for permanent residency”(Mills, 2017). A “less well-documented 
condition of the offer” set a deadline of 31 January to apply for the amnesty 
(Pasha-Robinson, 2018). 
Contempt is also revealed in the struggles between survivors and 
residents on the one hand and central government on the other around the 
Public Inquiry. First, contrary to assurances from Government, local residents 
were not consulted before the appointment of Judge Sir Martin Moore-Bick to 
lead the Public Inquiry, in the light of which Justice4Grenfell concluded that 
this “further compounds the survivors and residents sense of distrust in the 
official response to this disaster” (Justice4Grenfell, 2017a) – and had they 
been consulted they would likely have objected to the appointment (Edwards, 
2017). Following this was the protracted process in which the limited initial 
Terms of Reference of the Inquiry were challenged (Wearmouth, 2017) and 
then largely confirmed, itself followed by the Inquiry’s formal December 2017 
opening, at which the lack of even indirect representation of residents was the 
key point of contention (Bowcott and Gentleman, 2017). Only on the virtual 
eve of its opening did Teresa May confirm that there would be a Phase 2 of 
the Inquiry to which two panel members would be appointed. Of this partial, 
last-minute concession, Deborah Coles of INQUEST stated, “at every stage, 
bereaved and traumatised families have had to fight to be at the centre of the 
inquiry” (The Guardian UK, 2018). Controversy over the location of the Inquiry 
continued long after it had opened (Booth, 2018c). 
This sense of constantly having to struggle to be heard, of being treated 
without sensitivity, being at worst lied to or at best told half-truths, must 
surely exacerbate feelings of mis-trust, of being treated as worthless, as 
contemptible – exactly the same characteristics which defined many of the 
ways in which residents felt they were treated prior to the fire mirroring the 
ways in which their concerns about safety in the tower were dismissed 
(Grenfell Action Group, 2016). The contempt displayed towards the residents 
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before the fire was maintained and reproduced after the fire. It was popularly 
recognised as a cause of the fire per se. As one resident stated outside the 
tower as it continued to burn, “We’re dying in there because we don’t count” 
(Wynne-Jones, 2017). “The people who died and lost their homes, this 
happened to them because they are poor” (C4 News, 15 June, 2017). 
Very quickly after the fire, “cost-cutting” emerged “as key theme in the 
Grenfell refurbishment” (Booth and Evans, 2017). In 2014, a decision was 
taken to replace fire-resistant zinc cladding in the refurbishment contract 
“with cheaper aluminium panels to save £293,368”, with further evidence of 
the drive to cut costs in an “urgent nudge email” which KCTMO’s project 
manager sent to Artelia, its cost consultant, about cladding prices. It said: “We 
need good costs for Cllr Feilding-Mellen and the planner tomorrow at 
8.45am!” (cited in Booth and Grierson, 2017). This option was chosen. It was 
an option chosen by a Council with £274m in reserves at the time of the fire, 
and one which had, in 2014, “decided to hand back £100 to residents paying 
the top rate of council tax after a claimed ‘overachieving efficiency drive’” (Syal 
and Jones, 2017). This is also the same Council which, in 2016, had raised 
£4.5m from the sale of just two of its homes, more than the cost of all of the 
cladding used in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment (Booth and Evans, 2017). 
As one resident said to the new Council leader at a public meeting, “the culture 
that you promote is the same culture that brought Grenfell into being. Because 
you don’t listen, you don’t care” (C4 News, 4 November, 2017). Indeed. 
 
Financial and Economic Harms 
There is no way of knowing what costs have been incurred, and continue to be 
incurred, by former residents of the Tower, as well as those living in the 
vicinity. These may include, but not be restricted to, costs associated with: 
• survival and subsistence in the immediate aftermath of the 
fire, when the authorities (beyond basic fire, rescue and medical 
services) were notable for their absence 
• arranging and /or attending funerals and memorials 
• travel to and from medical appointments, and the cost of 
medication  
• traveling to and from school or work from temporary 
accommodation,  
• lost wages through being unable to attend work for whole 
periods or miss portions due to increased travel time or attending 
medical meetings, accompanying family and/or friends, engaging in 
community meetings, and so on 
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• the need to replace goods where households were un- or 
under-insured 
• eating whilst living in temporary accommodation where food 
preparation is limited or impossible  
• engaging in any form of leisure activities whilst living in 
temporary accommodation where networks are disrupted and where 
the various accoutrements of sustainable leisure activity (from play-
stations to books to footballs) are removed in space or simply gone. 
 
Of course, many of these costs are potentially compensable. So it is simply not 
possible to detail the financial costs to individuals or households. That said, if 
there are financial harms experienced by individuals and households as a 
result of the fire, these are dwarfed by the costs to local, regional and national 
economies which are likely to follow the fire. Again, we can only indicate and 
scratch the surface here, but we know enough to indicate that these economic 
costs will be significant, not least as central Government continues to enforce 
an era of austerity.   
At the local level, RBKC Council faces heavy financial costs following the 
fire. Having reportedly opted for cheaper cladding to save less than £300,000, 
the Borough faces enormous costs in responding to the fire – on one estimate, 
these had reached £7m within two months of the fire (Sherwood, 2017c). It 
also faces the possibility of an unlimited fine if corporate manslaughter is 
proven. It will have legal fees for the public inquiry and any criminal case; 
following the six deaths in the Lakanal House fire in 2009, Southwark Council 
spent at least £3.34  million on legal costs for the inquests alone (Blunden, 
2012), that is, not counting the costs of the subsequent court case which it lost 
and where it was eventually fined £570,000 for breaches of fire safety 
legislation (Knutt, 2017). It needs to fund temporary accommodation for an 
extended period for many households, as noted above, in a very high-rent 
area. This does not include the costs associated with clean-up, nor payments, 
for example, such as “financial support for victims, counselling, extra rates 
relief for nearby businesses and the tab for extensive fire safety tests” (Barej, 
2017). 
Costs to central Government will also be significant. In the immediate 
aftermath of the fire it set up a £5m emergency fund, received demands from 
the London Fire Brigade for specific equipment for any future such fires and 
also a request for close to £1m for the Fire Brigade to “participate fully in the 
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public inquiry” (Barej, 2017).  Meanwhile, the costs of the inquiry itself will run 
into millions.5  
None of this is to mention the fallout costs for other councils across the 
country. In the wake of the fire, numerous councils tested cladding on high 
rise tower block and other public buildings, notably hospitals. Results were 
confused and different types of tests were used by different local authorities 
and in some cases by the same Local Authority at different points in time.  One, 
Camden, removed tenants from five tower blocks in order to remove 
dangerous cladding within days of the fire at Grenfell. In August 2017, it was 
announced that the trauma unit at the John Radcliffe hospital in Oxford would 
close for up to a year due to fire safety concerns. 
By October 2017, 31 local authorities had approached the Government 
with requests for funding – the DCLG was in “detailed discussions with six” 
while the others had been asked to provide further information as to how the 
proposed measures were “essential” rather than “additional” safety measures 
(Booth, 2017). This despite Sajiv Javid’s statement immediately after the fire, 
when he noted that lack of financial resources should not prevent necessary 
works going ahead. “All the councils said they had been advised to carry out 
works by their local fire brigades” (Booth, 2017). One key, but not the only, 
issue appeared to be the retro-fitting of sprinkler systems to buildings (ibid.) 
Finally, in a Parliamentary debate on Grenfell in May 2018 on the eve of the 
opening of the Inquiry proper, Teresa May announced that £400 million would 
be made available by central Government for work on replacing cladding on 
158 tower blocks – only for it to be revealed days later that this funding would 
be diverted from its existing Affordable Homes Programme. Still roughly the 
same number of tower blocks where similar cladding needed removing 
remained in state of limbo, as private owners generally wrangled with tenants 
over the costs of the work (Booth at el., 2018, Booth, 2018a). A ballpark 
estimate of costs “to the country” of re-cladding published a year after the fire 
put this at £1billion (Booth and Bowcott, 2018). 
In a sense, then, we are all already paying, and will all continue to pay for 
untold years to come, for the fallout from Grenfell Tower. The effects of 
Grenfell Tower are not confined to residents, the local community or even the 
Borough – there are ripple effects that are flowing and will continue to flow 
through communities across the UK, at least. But it is important to emphasise 
that this does not mean that these effects, and indeed the financial and 
economic costs specifically, will be evenly distributed. Since costs will be met 
 
5 “The 2012 Leveson inquiry into press standards cost £5.4m, Sir John Chilcot’s Iraq inquiry, which 
reported last year after seven years, cost £13.1m and the Bloody Sunday inquiry up to £192m.” (Barej, 
2017) 
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by local authorities and central Government, then it is reasonable to assume 
that local and central Government expenditure in other areas will be cut to 
meet the increased cost fallout from Grenfell. This in turn means that those 
who are most dependent upon central or local services and facilities – and 
these are people who are the least financially independent – will be hardest 
hit. The poor, the disabled and the sick, those on various forms of benefits, 
children in the mainstream school system, and, with no little irony, those in 
social housing or who lack access to adequate or any accommodation at all, all 
will be impacted upon. The least hard-hit will be the most financially 
independent – the wealthiest. 
 
After Grenfell: Crime, Harm and Justice 
 
Weeks after the Grenfell Tower fire, the Metropolitan police announced it had 
reasonable grounds to suspect that both the RBKC Council and the KCTMO 
may have committed the offence of corporate manslaughter, under the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide (CMCH) Act 2007 (Dodd and 
Sherwood, 2017). This announcement did not exclude possible charges against 
the main contractor, Rydon, and some 60 companies who had played 
significant roles working on Grenfell over the years.  
Now, leaving aside the lamentable failure of the CMCH Act in its first ten 
years of existence to do that for which it was ostensibly designed – that is, hold 
large, complex undertakings to account for death(s) (Tombs, 2018b) - 
prosecution under the Act is at best far from certain, and surely far into the 
future. But even a ground-breaking corporate manslaughter prosecution 
following Grenfell would not represent justice, in several senses. First, 
corporate manslaughter charges against organisations are likely to be at the 
expense of gross negligence manslaughter charges against individuals (ibid.) – 
the latter representing a clear demand on the part of survivors. Second, in the 
event of conviction, the sanction will be a fine – and one far short of the levels 
originally anticipated when the Act was introduced (ibid.). Third, any fine 
against a public authority, notably the Council, will be dispersed to the 
innocent – that is, to Council tax payers and residents, impacting 
disproportionately upon those on lower incomes who rely most on council 
services; in other words, the poorest in the Borough. 
But there is one sense in which convictions following the Grenfell fire 
would represent justice – marking the killings as a crime, with a potentially 
powerful symbolic message; conversely, a lack of prosecution will send a clear 
and powerful message: that justice and accountability is less available for the 
relatively poor and marginalized, and that the relatively powerful act with 
greater impunity in the face of law and the criminal justice system. This would 
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add to the senses of injustice and harm experienced by the victims and the 
bereaved, producing a double-victimisation: first at the hands of the 
corporation or state, and then at the hands of the criminal justice system (Snell 
and Tombs, 2011). In the context of Grenfell, such further harms would be the 
cruellest of ironies, further adding to the searing, layered, complexly related, 
long-term harms outlined in this article.  
I have argued that a social harm approach allows us to examine what 
happened at Grenfell as much more than the event upon which the criminal 
law must inevitably focus.  The fire has generated a variety of more or less 
manifest dimensions of social harms which have unfolded spatially and 
temporally – and will continue to do so. In a novel approach which those 
working with the social harm perspective might critically adopt, adapt and 
develop, this article has indicated how these dimensions of harm need to be 
understood complexly: they have numerous dimensions, some of which are 
much more readily apparent; they unfold in ripples, initially and intensely 
within and around the loss of life in a burning tower, but then disperse 
geographically and longitudinally; and nor do these ripples unfold in a discrete 
sense – they are layered, they interact, and in combination they synergistically 
produce new and heightened levels of harm. But notwithstanding these 
analytical observations, this article has one chilling empirical conclusion: 
namely that the harms of Grenfell will endure, throughout many communities, 
within and beyond a corner of West London, for many, many years to come. 
What such an approach also underscores in policy and political terms is 
that criminal justice responses cannot adequately address such harms, nor 
indeed prevent further harm production. It is certainly the case that the fire, 
and thus the harms produced by it, were foreseeable and thus eminently 
preventable (Norrie, 2018). But this prevention is entirely outwith the system 
of criminal justice. It would require reversals in policies of deregulation, non-
enforcement of law against business organisations, and the erosion of levels 
of social protection via which we can understand the deaths at Grenfell as 
‘social murder’ (Tombs, 2016); it would need the voices of residents  - and 
those of workers, consumers, user-groups  - to be empowered; it would 
require genuine lines of accountability between citizens and elected politicians 
– as opposed, for example  to the creation of arms-length arrangements such 
as a Tenants Management Organisation, a key vehicle within local authority 
neo-liberalism designed to break lines of accountability and undermine 
democracy; and it would require respect not simply for the rights but also for 
the needs of people beyond political elites and profiteering private actors and 
the organisations they own and control. The harms of Grenfell could have 
been prevented, and further harms may be mitigated, not through criminal 
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justice mechanisms – but only through radical changes to economic, political 
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